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Abstract 
Legal professional privilege entitles parties to legal proceedings to object to disclosing 
communications. The form of legal professional privilege that is now commonly known as “legal 
advice privilege” attaches to communications between a client and its lawyers in connection with 
the provision of legal advice. The provision of legal advice increasingly involves the use of technology 
across a wide spectrum of activities with varying degrees of human interaction or supervision. Use of 
technology ranges from a lawyer conducting a keyword search of a legal database to legal advice 
given on-line by fully automated systems. With technology becoming more integrated into legal 
practice, an important issue that has not been explored is whether legal advice privilege attaches to 
communications between client and legal services provider regardless of the degree of human 
involvement and even if the “lawyer” might constitute a fully automated advice algorithm.  In 
essence, our central research question is if a robot gives legal advice, is that advice privileged? This 
article makes an original and distinctive contribution to discourse in this area through offering novel 
perspectives on and solutions to a question which has not previously been investigated by legal 
academics.   
Keywords 
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Introduction 
Legal professional privilege entitles parties to legal proceedings to object to disclosing written or oral 
communications. The privilege has two limbs. Litigation privilege, which is capable of encompassing 
confidential communications between legal adviser or client and third parties, such as expert and 
non-expert witnesses, is not considered further in this article. The focus of this article is on legal 
advice privilege, which attaches to confidential communications between client and lawyer made for 
the purpose of giving or receiving legal advice. 
The form of legal professional privilege that is now commonly known as “legal advice privilege”1 has 
its origins in the sixteenth century, with the rationale for its existence being fully developed during 
the nineteenth century.2 The privilege attaches to ‘communications passing between a client and its 
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1 For what appears to be the earliest example of the use of the expression “legal advice privilege” by the 
English courts see Re Highgrade Traders Ltd [1984] BCLC 15 per Oliver LJ, para 164. 
2 See Lord Taylor of Gosforth CJ in R v Derby Magistrates' Court, Ex parte B [1996] AC 487 at 504-506.  
lawyers, acting in their professional capacity, in connection with the provision of legal advice’.3 
Where it arises, it entitles the client to object to disclosing the communication, the right to claim or 
waive the privilege belonging to the client,4 not to the legal adviser. In order for the privilege to 
arise, the communications must be confidential, though the preservation of confidentiality does not, 
in itself, justify the existence of the privilege.5 Rather, its underlying rationale is that: 
in the complex world in which we live there are a multitude of reasons why individuals, 
whether humble or powerful, or corporations, whether large or small, may need to seek the 
advice or assistance of lawyers in connection with their affairs;…the seeking and giving of 
this advice so that the clients may achieve an orderly arrangement of their affairs is strongly 
in the public interest;…[I]n order for the advice to bring about that desirable result it is 
essential that the full and complete facts are placed before the lawyers who are to give it; 
and…unless the clients can be assured that what they tell their lawyers will not be disclosed 
by the lawyers without their (the clients') consent, there will be cases in which the requisite 
candour will be absent.6 
It is possible to identify statutory formulations of legal advice privilege for specific purposes.7 Statute 
may abrogate the privilege expressly or by necessary implication8 and has extended similar 
protections to clients of specified types of non-lawyer legal services provider.9 Even so, the privilege 
remains a creature of the common law.10  
This article makes an original and distinctive contribution to discourse in this area through offering 
novel perspectives on and solutions to the question whether this common law privilege (developed 
in an age when lawyers and clients communicated either orally or via documents written using quill 
or dip pen and ink) can and should attach to communications between a client and a robot.   
In answering this question, the following areas are investigated. First, whether the rationale 
underlying the existence of legal advice privilege encompasses communications between clients and 
robots. Secondly, whether legal advice privilege at common law may be applicable to such 
communications. Thirdly, whether robots may be capable of giving advice that qualifies as legal 
advice for the purposes of legal advice privilege. Fourthly, whether a robot is capable of being a legal 
adviser for the purposes of legal advice privilege. Fifthly, if legal advice privilege is not applicable to 
robot/client communications, whether statutory intervention extending the privilege to such 
communications would be desirable. Finally, if legal advice privilege cannot attach to 
communications between a client and an unsupervised robot providing legal advice, what are the 
consequences for legal advice privilege where robots are deployed by human legal advisers in 
circumstances in which the level of human lawyer supervision and/or understanding of the relevant 
algorithms is minimal?. Answering this latter question also involves consideration of the adequacy of 
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9 See, for example, s.190 of the Legal Services Act 2007.  
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relevant professional conduct rules. Underpinning our consideration of these questions is analysis of 
the approach adopted by the Supreme Court in R (Prudential plc and another) v Special 
Commissioner of Income Tax11 when considering whether communications between accountants 
and their clients for the purposes of giving or obtaining legal advice were privileged. We regard 
consideration of the analogy between accountants and robots providing legal advice as being of 
significant relevance as a predictor of the likely response of the Supreme Court to an assertion that 
the privilege should attach to robot/client communications. 
For the purposes of this article, the term robot is used in two different senses. First, to describe 
software enabling a client to give instructions and receive legal advice based on those instructions 
without the intervention of a human lawyer. Instructions could for example be given and advice 
received through a question and answer decision tree type mechanism.12 Secondly, to describe the 
situation where a client gives instructions and receives legal advice based on those instructions from 
a human lawyer who has made use of software in formulating that advice, for example increasingly 
sophisticated natural language processing self-learning software.13  
This article is written based upon the assumption that we will reach a time in which robots will be 
able to provide increasing varieties of legal advice to clients without engagement with (or with no 
more than nominal supervision by)  a human legal adviser. Marcus (2009: 273 – 281) speculates on 
the challenges to be overcome for the computer to become lawyer. For example, whether legal 
reasoning and analysis, particularly at the most creative end of the spectrum, is beyond replication 
by computer. However, as Marcus suggests “most lawyers spend most of their time doing legal 
analysis that is more the “fill the blanks” variety. That sort of activity might be done with some 
frequency by a computer” (Marcus 2009: 275). It is accepted that as the human legal adviser/robot 
relationship evolves, the giving of legal advice (and the nature of legal advice) may encompass a 
developing spectrum of possibilities with variable forms and levels of robot/human interaction and 
the article seeks to take account of this. In addition to the types of software mentioned in the 
preceding paragraph, areas currently identified in relation to which robots are predicted to play an 
ever-increasing role in the provision of legal services include, ‘discovery, legal search, generation of 
documents, creation of briefs and memoranda, and predictive analytics’ (McGinnis & Pearce, 2014: 
3065).  
 
Does the rationale underlying the existence of legal advice privilege encompass communications 
with robots providing legal advice?  
At one time it was believed that the rationale underlying the existence of legal advice privilege ‘was 
that a lawyer ought not, in honour, to be required to disclose what he had been told in 
confidence’.14 If this was still regarded as the justification for legal advice privilege it could be argued 
that the position of human legal adviser and robots so far as legal advice privilege was concerned 
could be distinguished on the basis that, unlike that of a human legal adviser, the “honour” of a 
robot cannot be impugned. Oxford Dictionaries defines “honour” as ‘the quality of knowing and 
doing what is morally right’.15 If the existence of legal advice privilege was still justified in terms of 
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14 See Lord Taylor of Gosforth CJ in R v Derby Magistrates' Court, Ex parte B [1996] AC 487 at 504.   
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impugning honour, whether this is a concept that is or potentially could be applicable to a robot 
might have provoked an interesting debate. A similar debate, relating to ethical awareness, is 
encountered below when considering whether a robot is capable of being a legal adviser.  
As was seen above, the existence of legal advice privilege is now justified upon the basis that ‘the 
seeking and giving of this advice so that the clients may achieve an orderly arrangement of their 
affairs is strongly in the public interest’.16 The argument that revealing confidential communications 
would amount to ‘a breach of honour, and [a] great indiscretion’ on the part of a human legal 
adviser was defeated long ago on the basis that there is no such indiscretion when disclosure is 
required by law (i.e. by an order of the court).17 Thus, it has long been clear that the privilege is a 
right belonging to the client, not to the legal adviser, the client being entitled to claim or to waive 
it.18 As the rationale for legal advice privilege is that it is in the public interest to enable clients to 
arrange their affairs in an orderly way, this objective would seem to be satisfied whether legal advice 
was given by a lawyer, by a non-lawyer human professional with appropriate expertise (such as an 
accountant) or by a robot. In R (Prudential plc and another) v Special Commissioner of Income Tax, 
the Supreme Court considered whether documents were covered by legal advice privilege when the 
legal advice in them was given by accountants rather than lawyers.19 The majority decided that at 
common law the privilege did not attach to legal advice given by professionals other than lawyers, 
any extension of privilege to non-lawyers requiring statutory intervention. However, when 
considering whether the rationale for legal advice privilege could encompass communications with 
robots, Lord Sumption’s dissenting judgment in Prudential is of particular interest. He held that legal 
advice given by accountants should be privileged because: 
[o]nce it is appreciated (i) that legal advice privilege is the client's privilege, (ii) that it 
depends on the public interest in promoting his access to legal advice on the basis of 
absolute confidence, and (iii) that it is not dependent on the status of the adviser, it must 
follow that there can be no principled reason for distinguishing between the advice of 
solicitors and barristers on the one hand and accountants on the other.20 
A justification put forward for restricting legal advice privilege to legal advice given by lawyers was 
that accountants did not currently have non-disclosure obligations under professional rules that 
equated to those applying to lawyers. Lord Sumption rejected this argument.21 In his view, if legal 
advice privilege attached to communications with accountants then the law of privilege would 
impose such duties upon them. In the same way it could be argued that if the law of privilege 
applied to communications between robot and client, legal services providers would be obliged to 
                                                          
16 Three Rivers District Council and others v Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No 6) [2005] 1 AC 
610 per Lord Scott of Foscote, para 34.  
17 Duchess of Kingston’s Case [1775-1802] All ER Rep 623 per Lord Mansfield CJ at 625-626. The case 
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122.  
21 R (Prudential plc and another) v Special Commissioner of Income Tax [2013] UKSC 1per Lord Sumption, paras 
124-125. 
ensure that the programming of such robots took account of the non-disclosure requirements 
imposed by legal advice privilege. For a number of reasons, Lord Sumption also rejected the 
argument that lawyers “have a unique relationship with the courts”. Whether a claim is made by a 
lawyer or by an accountant, the court can equally examine the legal and factual basis of a privilege 
claim.  Privilege can attach to communications with foreign lawyers, or in circumstances in which the 
client erroneously believes the person providing advice is a lawyer, yet the English courts have no 
interest in or authority over the training or discipline of such persons. The privilege developed during 
a period when the professional standards of lawyers were very low with little or no supervision of 
their practices by the courts.22 Again, these arguments would seem to be equally applicable when 
one is considering whether the rationale underlying the existence of legal advice privilege is to 
communications between a client and a robot. 
The obvious difficulty in deploying Lord Sumption’s judgment in Prudential in support of the 
proposition that legal advice privilege could potentially attach to legal advice provided by a robot is 
that it was a dissenting judgment. The majority of the Supreme Court decided that the privilege did 
not attach to legal advice given by professionals other than lawyers. However, four of the six 
Supreme Court judges in Prudential did accept that, logically, the rationale underlying legal advice 
privilege was applicable to confidential legal advice given by professionals other than lawyers. For 
example, Lord Neuberger accepted that: 
LAP is based on the need to ensure that a person can seek and obtain legal advice with 
candour and full disclosure, secure in the knowledge that the communications involved can 
never be used against that person. And LAP is conferred for the benefit of the client, and 
may only be waived by the client; it does not serve to protect the legal profession. In light of 
this, it is hard to see why, as a matter of pure logic, that privilege should be restricted to 
communications with legal advisers who happen to be qualified lawyers, as opposed to 
communications with other professional people with a qualification or experience which 
enables them to give expert legal advice in a particular field.23 
It is therefore arguable that if their Lordships in Prudential could have been persuaded that a robot 
had ‘experience which [enabled it] to give expert legal advice’, they might have been persuaded 
that, as a matter of logic, communications between it and a client were capable of falling within the 
rationale for legal advice privilege. Marcus (2009: 294) points out that it can be argued that privilege 
should apply “to encourage customers to be candid in making entries on TurboTax type programs 
designed to provide legal advice.” But, as is demonstrated immediately below, this does not mean 
that the majority in the Supreme Court would have regarded such communications as privileged. 
 
Might legal advice privilege at common law be applicable to communications with robots 
providing legal advice? 
The majority in Prudential held that a decision to extend the ambit of legal advice privilege to 
encompass legal advice given by non-legal professionals was a matter for Parliament. The issue was 
regarded as one of policy which was best left to Parliament and Parliament had already chosen to 
legislate in the area of legal advice privilege, for example, by extending privilege to other 
professions.24 In addition, there was a risk of uncertainty regarding which professions would be 
                                                          
22 R (Prudential plc and another) v Special Commissioner of Income Tax [2013] UKSC 1per Lord Sumption, paras 
124 and 126. 
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encompassed by legal advice privilege had the appeal been allowed. 25 So, legal advice privilege can 
only be applicable to communications between a client and a robot provided that this does not 
amount to an extension to the common law privilege which, following Prudential, would require 
statutory intervention. In other words, the circumstances must be such that a robot could properly 
be regarded as a legal adviser at common law. This seems to be so even though Lord Sumption 
(using words that on their face would appear to be as applicable to developments in legal 
technology as to accountants) suggested that courts should be wary of leaving matters to Parliament 
where decisions can be made at common law which reflect Parliament’s intentions in the light of 
modern developments.26 
In order to determine whether communications with a robot may fall within legal advice privilege 
(i.e. whether the common law privilege is applicable to such communications) it is necessary to 
consider two matters. First, whether robots are capable of giving legal advice for the purposes of the 
common law privilege. Secondly, even if they are so capable, whether it is feasible that robots might 
be admitted to the legal professions, membership of which, the decision of the House of Lords in 
Prudential made clear, is a necessary requirement for privilege to attach. 
 
Can a robot give advice that qualifies as legal advice for the purposes of legal advice privilege? 
Communications between robot and client would only be privileged if they comprised the giving or 
receiving of legal advice. So, what constitutes “legal advice” in this context and is a robot capable of 
giving it? The nature of legal advice for the purposes of legal advice privilege was considered by the 
House of Lords in Three Rivers District Council and others v Governor and Company of the Bank of 
England (No 6) (Three Rivers).27 The case essentially required the court to determine what sort of 
communications between client and lawyer are protected by legal advice privilege and whether this 
might include what was described as “presentational advice”. In Three Rivers, the parameters of 
legal advice privilege are quite widely drawn. Referring to judgments from Balabel v Air India,28 their 
Lordships considered that legal advice is not limited to “telling the client the law; it must include 
advice as to what should prudently and sensibly be done in the relevant legal context”.29 As there 
must be a relevant legal context, legal advice privilege does not apply to all solicitor/client 
communications whatever their nature. For example, where a lawyer advises a client about business 
or financial matters, a relevant legal context may be lacking with the result that legal adviser/client 
communications will not be privileged.30 There will be situations where it is difficult to determine 
whether or not the advice has a relevant legal context. In Three Rivers, Lord Scott suggested that 
the question to ask was “whether the advice relates to the rights, liabilities, obligations or remedies 
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paras 47-72. In relation to the validity of the latter justification, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe has pointed out, 
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27 [2005] 1 AC 610. 
28 [1988] 1 Ch 317. 
29 Three Rivers District Council and others v Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No 6), [2005] 1 AC 
610, paras 38, 62, 111. 
30 Three Rivers District Council and others v Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No 6) [2005] 1 AC 
610, para 38.  
of the client either under private law or under public law”.31 If it did not so relate then the 
communications would not be privileged but if it did then a secondary question was whether the 
communication had taken place in circumstances which came within the policy justification for 
privilege. 32 Baroness Hale referred to the relevant legal context as being “...one in which it  is 
reasonable for a client to consult the special professional knowledge and skills of a lawyer, so that 
the lawyer will be able to give the client sound advice as to what he should do [or] not do, and how 
to do it…”.33 Lord Carswell expressed the view that “all communications between a solicitor and his 
client relating to a transaction in which the solicitor has been instructed for the purpose of obtaining 
legal advice will be privileged…provided that they are directly related to the performance by the 
solicitor of his professional duty as a legal adviser of his client.”34  
Considering the meaning of legal advice suggested in Three Rivers, the question that arises is 
whether the product of an automated process can come within these parameters and constitute 
legal advice for the purposes of legal advice privilege. Currently, automated legal services are 
delivered in a variety of ways. At one end of the spectrum is the no cost, decision tree type 
automated offer, that uses a fixed menu of options and directs the user to a relevant form or 
process they can then use to try and resolve their legal problem.35 At the more sophisticated end of 
the spectrum, there are the increasingly complex systems that can process huge amounts of data to 
respond to questions phrased in natural language.36  In between, there are hybrid offers, combining 
some purely on-line document creation services with access (at a cost) to a network of lawyers 
giving advice on-line.37   
Does the way in which automated technological processes work preclude them from giving what is 
regarded as legal advice for the purposes of privilege? cannot currently replicate the reasoning and 
analysis that a human lawyer would employ in giving legal advice. For example, even at the most 
sophisticated end of the spectrum, the IBM Watson type model relies on brute force processing to 
analyse data using word association and then calculate the probability of an answer being accurate 
(The Law Society of New South Wales, 2017: 42). At tThe lower end of the spectrum in terms of 
complexity,  is the decision tree style process. , is even further removed from human reasoning and 
analysis. Does this in itself preclude automated processes from giving what is regarded as legal 
advice for the purposes of privilege? Considering the judgments in Three Rivers, the key component 
of legal advice is the existence of a relevant legal context. Essentially, the communications must 
relate to private or public law rights, liabilities, obligations or remedies and must have been made in 
circumstances in which it was reasonable to seek the “special professional knowledge and skills of a 
lawyer”, the communications being directly related to the performance of the lawyer’s “professional 
duty as a legal adviser”. If the output of the automated process enabled the client to regulate their 
affairs in accordance with the law, then the underlying policy justification for legal advice privilege 
would be met. This could be the case with both a decision tree limited options process and a more 
                                                          
31 Three Rivers District Council and others v Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No 6) [2005] 1 AC 
610, para 38. 
32 Three Rivers District Council and others v Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No 6) [2005] 1 AC 
610, para 38.  
33 Three Rivers District Council and others v Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No 6) [2005] 1 AC 
610, para 62. 
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610, para 111. 
35 donotpay is an example of this type of offer: https://www.donotpay.com/parking/. 
36 ROSS Intelligence developed software to aid legal research, built on IBM’s Watson: 
https://www.ibm.com/blogs/watson/2016/01/ross-and-watson-tackle-the-law/ 
37 For example RocketLawyer, https://rocketlawyer.co.uk 
sophisticated natural language model, provided that the circumstances were such that it would be 
reasonable to consult a lawyer’s special knowledge and skills and the communications between the 
client and the robot were such as would fall within the ambit of performance of the duties of a legal 
adviser.   
As is true of a human legal adviser, the fact that a robot does not explicitly provide legal advice to 
the client would not mean that the interaction between it and the client in a relevant legal context 
would not implicitly amount to the provision of legal advice for the purposes of legal advice 
privilege. For example, in a conveyancing process, presenting the client with a contract to sign 
amounts to implicit legal advice that the contract is correctly drafted and complies with 
instructions.38 The position would appear to be the same where a robot, upon the basis of 
information provided by the client, drafts a document for the client to sign.  
Whether the automated software can perform a solicitor’s “professional duty” or possesses the 
professional skills of a lawyer is unclear. Professional duty in this context may mean duty to the 
client in accordance with relevant professional body codes of conduct or simply encompass the work 
that a solicitor normally carries out in a professional capacity. What is meant by the professional 
skills of a lawyer could simply encompass the skills required to perform the work that a solicitor 
normally carries out rather than relate to, for example, the specific skills required in order to qualify 
as a solicitor. Software could be programmed to comply with codes of conduct and, arguably, skills 
relevant to a particular area of practice are already demonstrated by legal advice software in order 
to adequately perform and advise on that area.  
The parameters of legal advice for the purposes of legal advice privilege are not framed by human 
reasoning, analysis and application. They are framed by context and underlying rationale. It should 
therefore be possible for automated legal advice software to give what constitutes legal advice for 
the purposes of legal advice privilege. The problem is that whilst the context in which advice is 
sought may be a relevant legal one, and the advice itself may qualify as legal advice, if the advice is 
sought from a robot it, like advice sought from an accountant, will not be privileged unless the robot 
is a lawyer.  
 
Can a robot be a legal adviser for the purposes of legal advice privilege? 
Is it conceivable that their Lordships in Prudential might have been persuaded that there were 
circumstances in which a robot could properly have been classified as a legal adviser at common law 
and (unlike an accountant) fall within the ambit of the common law privilege without the need for 
statutory intervention? Lord Neuberger  suggested that legal advice privilege ‘only applies to 
communications in connection with advice given by members of the legal profession, which, in 
modern English and Welsh terms, includes members of the Bar, the Law Society, and the Chartered 
Institute of Legal Executives…(and, by extension, foreign lawyers)’.39  
For a robot to be classified as a legal adviser would require professional bodies to open their 
membership to robots of the relevant type. As the Law Society has recognised, the debate about 
replacing human lawyers with artificial intelligence gives rise to “questions about what the core 
values of the legal profession are and what they should or could be in the future” (The Law Society 
of England and Wales, 2018: 13). But is it likely that a robot would ever be able to emulate the 
                                                          
38 In C v C [2006] EWHC 336 (Fam), para 32.  
39 R (Prudential plc and another) v Special Commissioner of Income Tax [2013] UKSC 1, para 29.  
essential attributes of a practising lawyer such that it could potentially satisfy all of the prerequisites 
to qualification as a solicitor, barrister or legal executive? For example, qualification as a solicitor 
currently involves meeting the “day one outcomes” through completion of prescribed academic and 
vocational training, including a period of work based learning.40 Even if it were possible for a robot 
to evidence completion of the required elements of assessment and training, it seems unlikely that a 
robot could demonstrate all the day one outcomes. Although a robot may arguably be able to 
demonstrate knowledge, analytical and practical skills such as drafting, the day one outcomes 
include, for example, the ability to recognise personal and professional strengths and weaknesses, to 
develop strategies to enhance professional performance and to work effectively as a team member. 
In addition, the ability to behave professionally and with integrity and to identify issues of culture, 
disability and diversity are required. It seems unlikely that a robot could effectively participate in the 
elements of training designed to meet these outcomes or indeed demonstrate these attributes. It 
may, within the foreseeable future, be impossible to design a robot that could meet all of the 
relevant prescribed characteristics to qualify as a lawyer. Remus and Levy make the point that the 
complexity of some legal tasks, such as human interaction where skills of emotional intelligence are 
involved, is such that they are unlikely to be reduced successfully to a set of coded instructions: 
Unscripted human interaction falls into this category because it often depends on 
formulating responses to unanticipated questions and statements. This, in turn, requires 
recognizing the broader context in which words are being used-not only the surrounding 
words…but the identity and motivation of the speaker and the purpose of the 
communication. (Remus & Levy, 2017:512).  
Even if it were possible to classify a robot as a legal adviser such that it could be admitted to the Roll 
of Solicitors or called to the Bar, this would then create significant challenges in terms both of 
reforming relevant professional bodies’ codes of practice, and in the programming of technology to 
interpret, apply and abide by such codes. Indeed, this last attribute is crucial if a robot is to be 
admitted to the legal profession. For example robots would need to possess the ability to refuse to 
act where ethical rules (or relevant statutory provisions, such as anti-money laundering) would be 
contravened. Consequently, ‘[i]t may be necessary to develop AI systems that disobey human 
orders, subject to some higher-order principles of safety and protection of life.’ (The Law Society of 
England and Wales, 2018: 13).41 With regard to professional body codes of practice, the Solicitors 
Regulation Authority (SRA) proposed changes, under which regulated solicitors could operate in 
unregulated firms, recognise that legal advice privilege may not attach to such communications 
(Solicitors Regulation Authority, 2017: paras 63-64).42 The reason appears to be that the retainer 
would be with the unregulated firm rather than with the regulated solicitor (The Law Society, 
2016:36). Presumably the same problem would arise if a robot was admitted as a solicitor but was 
deployed by an entity other than a regulated law firm. 
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41 Referring to Briggs, G., and Scheutz, M., (2017). The case for robot disobedience. Scientific American, 316,  
44-47. 
42 The SRA regarded the issue of whether legal advice privilege was applicable in such circumstances as one for 
the courts or Parliament. 
In considering whether a robot could potentially be a member of one of the legal professions, 
another issue that would require resolution under the current state of the law is whether a robot is 
capable of being a “person”. A similar problem was encountered when women first applied to be 
solicitors, even though women, unlike robots, have clearly always been persons within the normal 
usage of that term and undoubtedly possess the same professional attributes as their masculine 
counterparts. In 1919, the Court of Appeal held that a woman could not be admitted as a solicitor. 
Section 2 of the Solicitors Act 1843 referred to a “person [being] admitted and enrolled and 
otherwise duly qualified as an Attorney or Solicitor, pursuant to the Directions and Regulations of 
this Act.” Section 48 provided that “every word importing the Masculine Gender only shall extend 
and be applied to a Female as well as Male…unless…there by something in the Subject or Context, 
repugnant to such Construction”. The Court of Appeal held that, “the Act of 1843 confers no fresh 
and independent right, because it does not destroy a pre-existing disability”.43 The position was 
rectified by The Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act 1919, which provides that  
A person shall not be disqualified by sex or marriage from the exercise of any public 
function, or from being appointed to or holding any civil or judicial office or post, or from 
entering or assuming or carrying on any civil profession or vocation, or for admission to any 
incorporated society (whether incorporated by Royal Charter or otherwise),… 
So far as the potential for a robot to become a solicitor in the 21st century is concerned, s.1 Solicitors 
Act 1974 provides that  
No person shall be qualified to act as a solicitor unless— (a) he has been admitted as a 
solicitor, and (b) his name is on the roll, and (c) he has in force a certificate issued by the 
Society in accordance with the provisions of this Part authorising him to practise as a 
solicitor (in this Act referred to as a “practising certificate) 
It seems that a new statutory provision conferring personhood upon robots would be required in 
order for a robot to fall within the ambit of s.1 of the 1974 Act. An alternative approach would be a 
statute which perhaps for specific areas of legal practice gave certain types of robot the status of a 
person.  
The Law Society recently posed the question, ‘Far enough into the future, will AI/robots be 
sufficiently advanced to deserve ‘personhood’?’ and suggested that ‘the Common Law approach 
allows judges to evolve the law and, for some, it is an overreach to call for new laws when existing 
ones can be applied in, or transitioned to, new contexts’(The Law Society of England and Wales, 
2018:14). In view of the reluctance of the Supreme Court to extend the ambit of legal advice 
privilege, it is suggested that this is an area where legislation would be required if robots were to be 
treated as persons.   
Is it desirable to extend legal advice privilege by statute to encompass legal advice provided by a 
robot? 
Upon the assumption that, for the foreseeable future, it will not be possible for robots to qualify as 
members of one of the legal professions (thus preventing legal professional privilege at common law 
from encompassing legal advice provided by robots), the next question is whether statute should 
extend legal professional privilege to such advice. It is suggested that there are two reasons why 
such legislation might not be desirable. First, in a rapidly evolving environment of automated legal 
and other professional services, it would be extremely difficult to draft a provision which provided 
an adequate degree of certainty concerning which form of automated service benefitted from the 
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protection of legal advice privilege. This equates with a point made by Lord Neuberger in Prudential 
when declining to extend the ambit of the privilege at common law to accountants. In his dissenting 
judgment, Lord Sumption distinguished between persons “whose profession ordinarily includes the 
giving of legal advice” and “other advisory professions whose practitioners although not lawyers 
require some knowledge of law”.44 Lord Neuberger regarded this distinction as “carry[ing] with it an 
unacceptable risk of uncertainty and loss of clarity in a sensitive area of law”.45 He believed that 
requiring the courts to draw this distinction would require them “to delve into the qualifications or 
standing, and maybe into the rules and disciplinary procedures, of a particular group of people to 
decide whether the group constitutes a profession for the purpose of LAP”. 46  Similarly, he pondered 
whether the issue of whether a profession ordinarily included the giving of legal advice “[s]hould..be 
judged by reference to the profession generally, a particular branch of the profession or the practice 
of the particular member of the profession…” and “suspect[ed] that much of the advice given by 
most members of those professions could not infrequently be characterised as “legal” in nature by 
some people but not by others”.47 The difficulties identified by Lord Neuberger would equally be 
encountered by: Parliament in attempting to draft a provision extending legal professional privilege 
to robots; providers of automated services in attempting to determine whether the relevant 
statutory provision applied to some of the services that they provided; and potentially the courts 
when required to determine whether communications with an automated service fell within the 
ambit of the statutory provision. It is suggested that in order to provide certainty, statute would be 
required to legislate in terms of specific forms of automated advice (as it has done in the past when 
extending the ambit of legal professional privilege to specific professions such as patent attorneys, 
trade mark attorneys and licenced conveyancers)48 but that an attempt to legislate by adopting a 
more general formulation, such as that which Lord Sumption’s approach to human advisers might 
suggest, would result in significant uncertainty. In the ever-changing environment referred to above, 
even that would be problematic, as technological change potentially outpaces legislative definition. 
 
The second reason why legislation to confer legal advice privilege upon legal advice provided by 
robots might not be desirable concerns the relationship between the rationale for legal advice 
privilege and the ability of consumers to instruct specialist, cheap or free forms of legal advice. Some 
clients may not know of or care about the existence of legal advice privilege or may be prepared to 
forego it in order to obtain the service they want at the price they prefer.  As Lord Scott observed in 
Three Rivers, 49 in “many cases clients would have no inhibitions in providing their lawyers with all 
the facts and information the lawyers might need whether or not there were the absolute assurance 
of non-disclosure”.50 Some consumers already choose to consult other professionals for legal advice, 
such as accountants providing fiscal legal advice, even though their communications are not 
protected by privilege. Moreover, as was indicated above, recent reform proposals by the SRA, 
                                                          
44 Three Rivers District Council and others v Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No 6), [2005] 1 AC 
610, para 137.  
45 Three Rivers District Council and others v Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No 6), [2005] 1 AC 
610, para 54.  
46 Three Rivers District Council and others v Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No 6), [2005] 1 AC 
610, para 56.  
47 Three Rivers District Council and others v Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No 6), [2005] 1 AC 
610, para 57.  
48 See, respectively: Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, s.280; Trade Marks Act 1994, s.87; 
Administration of Justice Act 1985, s.33.  
49 Three Rivers District Council and Others v Governor and Company of the Bank of England [2004] UKHL 48 
50 Three Rivers District Council and Others v Governor and Company of the Bank of England [2004] UKHL 48, 
para 34 
approved by the Legal Services Board (LSB),51 will authorise solicitors to work in unregulated firms 
even though the SRA appears to accept that whether or not legal advice privilege will arise in 
relation to communications with such a person is uncertain (Solicitors Regulation Authority, 2017: 
62-66). The SRA does not intend “to provide a commercial advantage to any type of firm” and 
believes that  “regulated firms employing solicitors will continue to provide a strong "brand"; the 
difference is the ability to provide the full range of legal services (including reserved activities), the 
availability of legal professional privilege (LPP), and a range of consumer protections that are 
unrivalled by any other profession, either in the UK or internationally” (Solicitors Regulation 
Authority, 2017: 59).  Thus, the SRA and, by approving its proposals, the LSB, both seem to accept 
that consumers are entitled to choose to instruct legal service providers even though it is uncertain 
whether legal advice privilege will attach to communications with those providers. whom may or will 
not attract legal advice privilege. The approach of the SRA and its approval by the LSB would suggest 
that Legislating to extend legal advice privilege to encompass communications with robots providing 
legal advice would go against the trend of supporting increased consumer choice in the provision of 
legal services and would not reflect the reality that markets commonly include a variety of product 
at different pricing levels that possess different attributes.  For this reason, legislative change to this 
effect does not appear to be desirable and the drafting issues referred to above would seem to 
suggest that it is not practicable.  
Upon the assumption that legislation to extend legal advice privilege to robots providing legal advice 
is not desirable, it could be argued that a proportionate response to the provision of legal services by 
robots would be to impose a requirement for a clear health warning concerning the absence of legal 
advice privilege.  This would enable the consumer to make an informed choice whether to obtain 
traditional legal services or whether, at reduced cost, to use a robot even though privilege would not 
be applicable. In England and Wales, not all areas of legal practice are reserved to lawyers.  A 
commercial undertaking may currently offer legal services in unreserved areas in a number of ways: 
through an unregulated human adviser or entirely via automated software. For example, 
accountants regularly give tax advice which, if given by a lawyer, would be privileged. In either case, 
as a lawyer is not involved in giving advice then privilege will not arise. However, in the former case 
there is still contact between non legal adviser and client and the opportunity for a client to ask or 
the adviser to explain that legal advice privilege is not available. (This does not guarantee, of course, 
that such a question will be asked and/or that such guidance will be provided). Where an entirely 
automated process is used to give advice, legal advice privilege will not be available and a consumer 
using this type of service may well have no idea that this is the case.  
Whether a client makes use of a human non-legal adviser or an automated system, it may be that, as 
has already been suggested, for the expertise that the non-legal human adviser (e.g. an accountant) 
can provide or the convenience and benefit that a low cost on-line advice service can offer, the 
consumer is happy to trade off having the protection of legal advice privilege.  Sheppard points out 
that both LegalZoom and Rocket Lawyer include disclaimers on their websites advising customers 
that communications are not protected by attorney-client privilege. He suggests  that “At this price 
point, there appears to be consumer demand for the product. LegalZoom claims to have had over 
three million customers. Rocket Lawyer, another online legal documents creator, claims to have 
created over three million documents for customers….” (Sheppard, 2015: 1840). This means that 
clients using such services, for example, to assist when forming a business or drafting an 
employment agreement would not be able to rely on legal advice privilege. Provided that they have 
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both read the disclaimers and have understood what it is that they are giving up, they have made an 
informed choice.  It may be that in the context of communications with a robot for such purposes 
there will often be little disadvantage to the client in not being able to claim the privilege, given the 
limited nature of the communications that are likely to take place in the context of the current level 
of  sophistication of such robots. 
A counter argument to the imposition of a mandatory warning requirement where robots give 
unprivileged legal advice is that no such requirement is currently imposed upon human non-legal 
advisers, such as accountants, when they give legal advice. Indeed, in relation to its proposals 
concerning solicitors in unregulated firms, the SRA has suggested that: 
[i]t is down to the individual solicitor to make it clear to their clients what level of protection 
that client has and where such protections would be appropriate and/or relevant. In most 
circumstances this will not be an issue, but there may be occasions when a solicitor working 
in a non LSA regulated firm should advise their client on the benefits of privilege. This may 
include advising them of the option to seek advice from a solicitor in a regulated firm in 
order to make sure that this attracts privilege” (Solicitors Regulation Authority, 2017:66). 
This does not suggest that the SRA believe that the giving of such a warning by a solicitor in an 
unregulated form should be mandatory.  
There is currently no mandatory warning where legal advice is given by a human non-legal adviser. It 
seems that such a warning will not be required when, in future, such advice is given by solicitors in 
unregulated firms. It would seem anomalous to require such a warning where legal advice was given 
by a robot. One argument might be that such a mandatory warning requirement should be imposed 
both on robots and on humans. Yet accountants, for example, would undoubtedly regard it as wholly 
unfair were they required to add to the illogical commercial disadvantage of legal advice privilege 
not attaching to communications with their clients, made for the purposes of giving or obtaining 
legal advice, a requirement that they were required to spell this out. Indeed, in areas where the non-
existence of privilege might be little or no disadvantage to the client, could the imposition of such a 
health –warning potentially chase clients away from specialist, efficient, low cost or free services, 
either towards more expensive services that provide them with no tangible advantage or even 
discourage them from using any service, which would act contrary to the rationale underlying the 
existence of the privilege. If the existence of a specialist, cheap or free automated system results in 
clients utilising the system to arrange their affairs in accordance with the law then the rationale 
underlying the existence of the privilege is achieved by another means.   Moreover, an attempt to 
legislate to impose mandatory health warnings would give rise to the same problems of legislative 
drafting etc that were identified above, i.e. the issue of how to define the forms of automated legal 
services (or indeed human service providers) to which such a warning requirement would apply.  
Consequently, the imposition of such a mandatory health warning requirement does not appear to 
be desirable or practicable.  
 
What are the consequences for legal advice privilege where robots are deployed by human legal 
advisers in circumstances in which the level of human lawyer supervision is minimal?   
Upon the assumption that robots will not be admitted to membership of one of the legal professions 
in the foreseeable future, does the use of a robot by a law firm to deliver legal services have the 
potential to defeat a claim of privilege in circumstances in which the level of human supervision of 
the robot and/or understanding of how the robot performs its tasks is minimal? Clearly, lawyers 
regularly use databases such as Lexis or Westlaw as research tools and it seems unlikely no one 
would suggest that this, equating with the use of the traditional paper-based law library, has 
potential to negate the existence of legal advice privilege. Equally, paralegals and trainee solicitors, 
acting under the supervision of qualified solicitors, are frequently involved in the provision of legal 
services, and it has never been suggested that their involvement provides a threat to the existence 
of legal professional privilege.52 Conversely, legal advice privilege does not attach to 
communications where a human other than a legal adviser (e.g. an accountant) does not merely act 
as a conduit for communications between legal adviser and client but is required to bring material 
into existence.53  
What would the position be if a robot, deployed by a law firm and supervised by a human lawyer, 
was so sophisticated that it was capable of receiving the client’s instructions in their original form 
and of providing full legal advice based on those instructions without the intervention of a human 
legal adviser?  If such a robot was merely used as a tool by a human legal adviser, who considered its 
recommendations and then made a decision relying on them, on any other relevant information and 
on the human legal adviser’s own expertise, the position would seem to equate with the use by a 
lawyer of a sophisticated version of traditional legal databases. There would seem to be no reason 
why the use of the robot in this way would prevent legal advice privilege from arising. What, 
however, if legal advice produced by such a robot was merely rubber stamped by a human legal 
adviser through whose hand the instructions and the advice had passed? It may be that the legal 
adviser had little or no understanding of how the robot had reached its conclusions (and perhaps, if 
inexperienced, had little or no understanding of the instructions or the advice). This would appear to 
give rise to ethical/professional conduct issues and, we would assert, should also prevent legal 
advice privilege from attaching to communications with the robot.  
 
In its report on The Future of Law and Innovation in the Profession, a Commission of Enquiry 
established by the Law Society of New South Wales posed the following questions:  
 
[w]here a lawyer provides a legal service that has been supported by technology…can [the 
duty to deliver legal services competently] be discharged if the lawyer does not have, at the 
very least, a basic understanding of how that technology works?...[T]o what extent should 
[the] lawyer be required to understand the workings of the algorithms and the integrity of 
the data used to produce the legal work?...[T]o what extent should [the] lawyer be required 
to understand the technologies used…to ensure data security?” (The Law Society of New 
South Wales, 2017:41). 
 
These comments suggest that it is necessary to question the ability of lawyers to deliver legal 
services competently in circumstances in which they do not understand the technology that 
supports their work.  They are clearly applicable to robot generated legal advice where human 
intervention is low level, limited and does not involve applying professional skill and judgment to 
assess the advice that has been given. The “supervising” lawyer in this scenario has no knowledge of 
the workings of the software used to generate the advice, may not know what data sources have 
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been accessed to do so, or indeed how secure these data sources are at any given time, and may 
have had little or no meaningful engagement with the client’s instructions.  
 
Is there a point at which advice provided by a robot under the nominal supervision of a human 
lawyer should not be regarded as being privileged at common law because, to paraphrase Lord 
Neuberger, it could not properly be said to be “given by a member of the legal profession”?54 Upon 
the assumption that the robot has not been admitted to one of the legal professions, we would 
assert that legal advice privilege should not attach in circumstances in which there is no effective 
supervision of its work by a member of the legal profession. The use of an identical robot by an 
accountancy firm would not attract privilege even if the accountant understood the workings of the 
robot and contributed their own skill and knowledge to the ultimate advice given. For privilege to 
attach in circumstances where there is no effective supervision by a lawyer, merely because the 
robot is deployed by a law firm, would seem to provide law firms with a commercial advantage 
which the decision of the Supreme Court in Prudential does not appear to justify.    
Potential objections to the existence of legal advice privilege based upon the lack of supervision of 
robots by lawyers could be countered by modification of the professional conduct code for solicitors 
so as to explicitly cover required minimum levels of supervision where technology is heavily used in 
a law firm to give almost entirely automated advice. A more difficult issue is how such rules should 
deal with the issue of lack of understanding of what the technology being supervised is actually 
doing and how it is doing it. As was suggested above, a point may presumably be reached at which 
such lack of understanding renders supervision by a lawyer purely nominal. This lack of 
understanding may also affect those who develop systems. For example “networks are often “black 
boxes”, in which the (decision making) processes taking place can no longer be understood and for 
which there are no explanatory mechanisms.” (van den Hoven van Genderen, 2018date: 50-51). 
Perhaps the rules should require that systems make clear to lawyers what they are doing, it having 
been suggested that “where algorithms do not provide causal accounts, the ethics of decision-
making become opaque” (Devins, Felin, Kauffman, and Koppl , 2017: 398). And/or, it may be that 
such requirements should relate to the  provision of services by lawyers and IT service providers in a 
holistic manner, ensuring that the provision of technological legal services is safeguarded by an 
adequate combination of legal and IT expertise, working in conjunction. This could be in accordance 
with agreed methodologies that safeguard the competent delivery of legal services, including 
professional obligations related to legal professional privilege. Rob van den Hoven van Genderen 
(2018:51) suggests that a mechanism which allows some degree of transparency regarding how 
artificial intelligence systems work could become a legal requirement. 
 
In relation to the suggestion that conduct rules could be amended to deal with the impact of legal 
technology, two particular issues arise as regards the position of solicitors, by far the largest of the 
legal professions,55 in England and Wales. First, the SRA intends to introduce distinct codes for 
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55 On July 31 2017 there were 139,624 solicitors with practising certificates in England and Wales. The Law 
Society, Annual Statistics Report 2017 https://www.lawsociety.org.uk/support-services/research-
trends/annual-statistics-report-2017/. In contrast, there were 16,435 barristers in practice in England and 
Wales in 2017, Bar Standards Board, Practising Barrister Statistics 
https://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/media-centre/research-and-statistics/statistics/practising-barrister-
statistics/. The Chartered Institute of Legal Executives has approximately 20,000 members, of whom about 
7,500 are qualified Chartered Legal Executive Lawyers   Chartered Institute of Legal Executives, Facts, Figures, 
Statistics https://www.cilex.org.uk/media/interesting_facts/facts__figures. 
solicitors and for firms,56 so one issue would be which provisions should ideally be in which code. For 
example, it might be that provisions concerning the interaction between a legal service provider and 
its IT service providers should be in the code relating to firms, with requirements relating to the 
competence of solicitors in relation to IT being in both codes. The second issue presents the greater 
problem, however. It is that the SRA intends to take a shorter, sharper, less prescriptive approach to 
regulation (Solicitors Regulation Authority, 2018: 21,23). In its consultation response to the SRA, the 
Law Society suggested that: 
 
[t]he codes are shorter and simpler and the overarching Principles have been reduced from 
10 to 6, losing the principle “provide a proper standard of service” amongst others. This is 
both a standards and client protection issue. Furthermore the language in the codes is so 
lacking in specificity that firms will spend more time trying to establish what will comprise 
compliance; there will also clearly be a wide margin of discretion for the regulator to decide 
what constitutes compliance (The Law Society, 2016:22). 
It seems unlikely that the SRA will contemplate more detailed provision in its codes of the type that 
we considered above. Conversely, in New South Wales, the Law Society Commission of Inquiry 
recommended that the Law Society establish a centre for legal innovation projects. It suggested that 
the centre should, inter alia, “conduct and present research into the ethical and regulatory 
dimensions of innovation and technology, including solicitor duties of technological competence, in 
close collaboration with the Law Society’s Professional Standards Department and Legal Technology 
Committee” (The Law Society of New South Wales, 2017:43).  
It could be argued that, so far as developing technology is concerned, the SRA’s less prescriptive 
approach to regulation does make sense, given that “increases in the power of computing are 
exponential rather than linear” (McGinnis & Pearce, 2014:3046). Thus, requirements regulating the 
nature of the relationship between robots and human lawyers could easily be obsolete as soon as 
(or even before) they came into force. This could result in regulations concerning the operation of 
older technologies rapidly becoming ineffective as new technologies develop. Alternatively, the 
creation of such regulations could hinder the development and/or implementation of new 
technologies since “unnecessary regulation [can] chill additional innovation” (American Bar 
Association, 2016:41). The likelihood is that the limits of legal advice privilege as it does or does not 
exist in the context of varying degrees of robot/human legal adviser interaction will need to be 
explored by the courts. It may be that regulatory body action will only be catalysed, if at all, if future 
judicial decisions make clear that developments in the technology underlying the provision of legal 
services by solicitors  operating in regulated law firms threatens the existence of the privilege to the 
detriment of the public.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This article makes an original and distinctive contribution to discourse in this area through offering 
novel perspectives on and solutions to the previously unexplored question of whether common law 
legal advice privilege can and should attach to communications between a client and a robot.  In 
answering this question, the following areas have been investigated. 
                                                          
56 The SRA’s application for approval of changes relating to its Looking to the Future proposals was approved 
by the Legal Services Board on November 6th 2018  
https://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/news_publications/LSB_news/PDF/2018/20181106_LSB_Approves_SR
As_Looking_To_The_Future_Rule_Change_Application.html  
First, whether the rationale underlying the existence of legal advice privilege encompasses 
communications between clients and robots. Applying the decision of the Supreme Court in 
Prudential, it is clear that the rationale underlying legal advice privilege is capable of applying to 
communications between a client and a robot giving legal advice. Allowing a client to arrange its 
affairs in accordance with relevant legal provisions is strongly in the public interest and, in this 
respect, complete candour is promoted by the ability to keep communications between client and 
legal adviser confidential. This rationale is equally applicable to legal advice given by a human non-
legal professional or by a robot. 
 
Secondly, whether legal advice privilege at common law may be applicable to communications 
between clients and robots. Again, by analogy with the decision in Prudential, which concerned the 
position of accountants, it seems to be clear that the courts would be unlikely to extend the privilege 
in this way and would regard such a decision as one for Parliament, unless it is possible for a robot to 
be classified at common law as a member of one of the legal professions and to give advice that 
qualifies as legal advice for the purposes of the privilege. 
 
Thirdly, whether robots may be capable of giving advice that qualifies as legal advice for the 
purposes of legal advice privilege. The parameters of legal advice for the purposes of legal advice 
privilege are not framed by human reasoning, analysis and application. They are framed by context 
and underlying rationale. As concluded above, it seems clear that the rationale underlying legal 
advice privilege is capable of applying to communications between a client and a robot giving legal 
advice. In terms of relevant legal context, the judgments in Three Rivers and other authorities 
referred to therein suggest that this requires that the communications must relate to private or 
public law rights, liabilities, obligations or remedies and must have been made in circumstances in 
which it was reasonable to seek the “special professional knowledge and skills of a lawyer”, the 
communications being directly related to the performance of the lawyer’s “professional duty as a 
legal adviser”. No matter how unsophisticated the software, the client is clearly consulting the 
automated system in the relevant legal context, for the purposes of receiving legal advice. If the 
output of the automated process enabled the client to regulate their affairs in accordance with the 
law, then the underlying policy justification for legal advice privilege would be met and the output 
could amount to legal advice even if it did not patently take the form of advice.  
 
Fourthly, whether a robot is capable of being a legal adviser for the purposes of legal advice 
privilege. Extrapolating the judgement in Prudential, if a fully autonomous robot can be regarded as 
a qualified lawyer, then legal advice privilege could attach to communications between client and 
robot. It is also clear from Prudential that, despite recognising the irrationality of restricting legal 
advice privilege to advice from qualified lawyers, at common law the privilege will not be extended 
to cover communications with other professionals. So, if a fully automated robot cannot be regarded 
as a qualified lawyer, despite being programmed to give legal advice, then legal advice privilege will 
not attach to communications with the client. At present, legal technology does not appear to be 
capable of producing a robot that possesses the combination of knowledge, skills and ethical 
awareness that would enable it to qualify as a member of one of the legal professions. In addition, in 
order for a robot to qualify as a solicitor, statutory intervention would be required either to amend 
section 1 of the Solicitors Act 1974 to encompass machines as well as persons or to give robots the 
status of persons. Moreover, if robots were to be admitted to membership of a legal profession, this 
would presumably require amendment of relevant professional conduct rules. 
 
Fifthly, we considered, if legal advice privilege is not applicable to communications between clients 
and robots, whether statutory intervention extending the privilege to such communications would 
be desirable. Prospective users of legal services may choose to instruct a non -lawyer for what is 
essentially legal advice in order to take advantage of specialist expertise with (or without) the 
knowledge that communications are not protected by legal advice privilege. For example instructing 
an accountant for fiscal legal advice. Consumers using free or low cost fully automated legal advice 
services are likewise making a choice, trading receiving a low or no cost service against the 
protections that come with instructing a lawyer, including the benefit of legal advice privilege. Again, 
the choice may or may not be an informed choice.  There seems to be no reason why consumers 
should not be entitled to choose to access free or cheap unprivileged automated legal advice. 
Moreover, attempting to draft statutory provisions identifying the types of automated advice to 
which privilege would attach would appear to give rise to issues of uncertainty similar to those that 
Lord Neuberger identified in Prudential when he indicated that if legal advice privilege was extended 
beyond lawyers there was a risk of uncertainty regarding which professions would be encompassed. 
Thus, attaching legal advice privilege to legal advice provided by robots is arguably unnecessary, 
potentially problematic and unless statute also extended the privilege to human non-legal advisers 
would put the latter at an unfair competitive disadvantage.  
 
An alternative would be to require providers of automated legal services to make clear that their 
services are unprivileged. Whether this would result in consumers having a full understanding of the 
significance of this fact is unclear. The disclaimers on the relevant websites might not be read at all 
or, if they were read, might not be understood. Where a human non-legal professional is instructed 
to give legal advice, they may not even provide the client with information concerning the non-
existence of legal advice privilege (the non-legal adviser may not even be aware of the issue). 
Requiring providers of automated legal advice to give such warnings would logically suggest that 
similar requirements should be imposed on human non-legal advisers who might well protest at 
being required to publicise what they could properly regard, post Prudential, as an unfair 
competitive advantage possessed by lawyers. Again, it could also result in significant uncertainty in 
identifying which types of automated or non-professional human advice should be classified as legal 
advice which falls within the ambit of such a warning requirement. It is suggested that whether legal 
advice privilege should attach to robots that give legal advice without human supervision and/or 
whether unprivileged services provided by robots should come with an appropriate health warning 
are both issues that, post Prudential, should be considered by Parliament, if at all, in line with 
equivalent reforms directed at human non-legal professionals who give legal advice.  
 
Finally, we considered the consequences for legal advice privilege of the use by a human legal 
adviser of a robot to provide legal advice in circumstances in which the level of supervision by a 
human legal adviser is at most nominal and where the understanding of relevant algorithms is 
minimal. Legal advice from a human legal adviser who, relying upon their professional skills and 
knowledge, utilises technological resources in formulating that advice, is and should be covered by 
legal advice privilege. This is currently the case where legal databases are used, for example to 
research the law and should continue to be the case where more sophisticated legal technology is 
utilised, provided that the lawyer is deploying their professional skill and judgment.   
If, however, a robot that was not a member of the legal profession, received client instructions and 
formulated legal advice with no more than nominal supervision from a human legal adviser, we 
assert that communications should not be protected by legal advice privilege. In these circumstances 
the lawyer is not using his or her professional skill and judgment to give advice, but is simply a 
conduit through whom the advice flows from the robot to the client. To allow privilege to apply in 
these circumstances would be to give law firms an unfair competitive advantage over other 
professions using similar technology to give legal advice.  
To counter suggestions of unfair competitive advantage in the above circumstances, relevant 
professional body codes of conduct could be amended to require minimum levels of supervision by a 
lawyer where technology is very heavily used by a law firm to give legal advice. Codes could also 
require prescribed levels of cognisance relating to how software works at a holistic level involving IT 
professional and lawyers so that the supervision that does take place is meaningful. The current 
trend towards less prescriptive regulation by the SRA makes such changes unlikely. Limited 
regulatory intervention is not necessarily a bad thing, both because in a rapidly evolving 
technological environment regulations might become obsolete virtually as soon as they are drafted 
and because overregulation might have the consequence of stifling desirable technological 
innovation. It remains for the courts to determine the extent to which variations in the level of 
robot/human lawyer interaction might threaten the existence of legal advice privilege, with detailed 
regulatory intervention being catalysed, if at all, depending upon the nature of such judicial 
determination.  
The fundamental question must be whether at some time in the future we reach a point at which 
the bulk of legal service provision to individuals and corporations is by technology which provides a 
relatively cheap and reliable service in an environment that does not give rise to legal advice 
privilege. If and when that point is reached, it may become clear that the presence or absence of the 
privilege is not a key factor either when potential clients are determining whether to obtain legal 
advice or when they are determining what information to disclose to their legal advisers. 
Consequently, it may be that the rationale underlying the very existence of legal advice privilege is 
eroded to such an extent that the necessity for its continued existence comes into doubt.  
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